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In the first half of the 1980s the U. S. debate about Central Arnerica was
often inflamed by widely varying perceptions about the direction of Nicaraguan
social arrl economic policies. '!he Reagan administration, for example,
repeatedly asserted that Nicaragua had become a clone of soviet
Marxism-Leninism, tenpered pemaps by tampering in CUban laboratories.1 'Ibis
impression of Nicaragua was fortified at times by the :rhetoric of the
sarrlinista govennnent. Moreover, the Irodes of historical analysis arrl political
thought IroSt frequently' encountered in conterrporary Nicaragua do reflect the
profourrl influence of Marxist thought in pre-1979 intellectual circles.
Most observers, however, including U.S. embassy personnel in Managua when
speaking not for attribution, seoff at the notion of Nicaragua as a simple
rerun of the CUban experience. Scholars of the CUban revolution arrl those
familiar with other socialist arrl non-socialist developments in the Westem
Hemisphere have been quick to note the differences between Nicaragua arrl CUba,
both in declared policy arrl in actual practice. '!hose studying the Nicaraguan
experience itself point to the non-Marxist origins of arrl the rationale for
many of the economic policies i1TIplemented during the first years of the
Sarrlinista regime.2 Indeed, the inportance of private capitalist production in
Nicaragua' s critical export sector, the evol ving nature of Nicaraguan agrarian
reform, the stimulus given to private-sector production by the Sarrlinista
govennnent (often at the cost of virulent criticism fram its IroSt radical
supporters), arrl the courting of foreign pri vate invesbnent, for example,
hardly fit with a simplistic view of the Nicaraguan economic experiment as
typically socialist.
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O1aracterizing the nature of revolutiona:ry Nicaragua thus remains a
difficult intellectual task. On the one hand, we must acknc::M1edge that the
Nicaraguan experience is by definition unique, since both the anti-Samoza
insurrection arrl its aftermath were attributable to 'unique social arrl political
forees. On the other hand, examining the histories of archetypical1y socialist
COlIDtries such as the soviet union arrl the Peoples Republic of China can bring
out certain criteria that will allow us to assess the socialist nature of the
Nicaraguan transforrnation. Arrl comparing Nicaragua with other atte.rrpts in the
Western Hemisphere to tum away from traditiona1 capital ism , particularly the
social experiments in CUba since 1959 arrl in Jamaica under Michael Manley, can
help us locate the Nicaraguan development strategy within a spectrum of other
COlIDtries' responses to dissatisfaction with traditional capitalist development
paths .
In making these comparisons, we do not discuss whether Nicaragua should
incorpora te the po1icies employOO by actuallyexisting socia1ist or various
transitional societies. Rather, we are sÍlTlply trying to establish reference
points by which to gain insight into the prob1ems arrl possibi1ities in
present-day Nicaragua. Certain inherent 1imitations, however, app1y to this
type of camparative analysis. First, even if the architects of the new
Nicaragua had intendoo to create, in sorne fom, "another CUba," the
geopo1itical rea1ities of a bipo1ar wor1d may have 100 them to restrain their
pub1ic pronouncements. Second, Nicaraguan economic po1icies were fo:rgOOin a
crucib1e of u. S. aggression that often seemed designOO to destroy the emerging
economic structure whatever its origins arrl tendencies. '!he reaction to this
aggression has 1ike1y 100 Nicaragua to adopt certain po1icies that may not have
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been part of the sandinistas' original development strategy, a point we return
tobelow.
In this essay, then, we characterize the evolution of the Nicaraguan
experiment,makin;J reference both to other transitional experiences and to the
unique characteristics of the Nicaraguan model. We develop a set of criteria by
which to characterize a transition as socialist, drawirq these criteria from a
brief camparison of the experiences of the soviet Union and the People' s
Republic of aÜna (especially durirq their periods of transition) and from an
examination of the "third path" of "democratic socialism" attercpted in Jamaica
in the 1970s. We then contrast the Nicaraguan experience with conparable
periods in what might be viewed as the conternporary application in the Western
Hemisphere of the archetypal Marxist-I.eninist or ortbodox socialist model: the
CUban revolution. We close by raisirq questions about the possibilities for
self-sustainirq econornic progress in Nicaragua and by notirq the challenge that
the Nicaraguan model presents for U. s. policy.
Whether because of historical precedence or sheer magnitude, the Soviet
Union and aÜna are often taken as the archetypes against which other socialist
experiments must be measured. Jameson and Wilber, for instance, propose an
implicit typology of socialism in developirq countries based on similarities te
and dissimilarities frorn these classic exaITples.3 Drawirq upon the experiences
of China and the Soviet Union, they suggest a set of "central questions which
will appear in any socialist development pattern": (1) the nature of the
initial seizure of power, (2) the changes wrought on the preexistirq society te
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create p:recornitions for socialism, (3) the development strategy then enacted,
(4) the nature of organizations and institutions subsequentlyerected, and (5)
the specific role of the state. ReviewinJ the histo:ry of. the socialist
archetypes with respect to these questions, theyargue, helps define bath a
rarge of policies that one should expect in new socialist societies and a set
of central prablem areas that must be addressed by any socialist IOOdel.4.
FitzGerald has pzoposed a separate set of overlappin;J prc::blems facinJ
small peripheral societies in the process of transition frau a histori9CÜ1y
inherited situation of capitalist underdevelopment. He calls attention to seven
concrete prablems: artialiation of different forros of production, reinsertion
into the international division of labor, labor and distrihution, price
fonnation and the appropriation of surplus, macroeconamic management ard
plannin;J, accumulation and econamic development, and the defense of the
transition itself.5
We draw upon these authors, as well as others, to develop several criteria
for evaluatinJ the socialist character of the society that has been created
(where there has been time for consolidation), the society toward which a
nation may be IOOVinJ, and the transitional policies that may have been
implemented to IOOVeit in that direction.6 Like Jameson and Wilber, we begin by
settinJ forth six criteria based upon various characteristics of the socialist
transition in the Soviet union and China. We return to these criteria later
when we evaluate the Nicaraguan experience since 1979. We begin with:
1. Initial DOlicies criteriat. '!he nature of the immedi.ate chan;Jes
implemented to brinJ about a transition toward socialism
provides a first test of the intent and direction of ultimate
change. Changes are more socialistic to the extent that the new
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regime immediately and dramatically reduces or eliminates
pri vate owners1llp, expands collective or state ownership, and
consolidates that control through changes in the supporting
financial and management institutions. .
'lhere were similarities in the initial actions of the revolutioI1éUY states
of the soviet union and China which indicated that the new leaders1llp hoped te
create the preconditions for socialist transition; these similarities are all
the IOOre striking because the conditions the two goverrnnents first encountered
were dramatically different. In both instances, the initial policy package
included rapid elimination of the economic role of foreign capitalists and
steps toward the collectivization of landed estates and nationalization of
irrlustries. In terms of FitzGerald's concern about how the revolutioI1éUY state
deals with the coexistence of differing forros of production, we would suggest
that, in both China and the soviet Union, old capitalist forros of production
were quickly eliminated, even before alternative socialist forros had been
clearly put in place.
2. labor m:uoess arrl basic needs critericn. One way te evaluate
the socialist character of state policies is to examine any
changes in the organization of the labor process and in the
provision of wage goods and other basic services. For the
underdeveloPed capitalist economy on the periphe:ry, the key
questions include: How does the new society replace the
economic pressures and institutionalized violence that
accornpanied primitive accumulation? How does it provide for
improvements in the fulfillment of basic needs? How does it
deal with the tension between the propensity for work intensity
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and productien te decline and the expectatien ef immediate
inprovements in the standard ef living?
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Both China and the soviet Unien paid significant early attentien te
improving educatien, health, and housing se:rvices. '!he principal focus,
however, soon shifted te the processes ef growth and accumulation. Both
societies have been criticized en the grounjs that this shift in focus toward
aggregate growth drew attentien away from the earlier goals ef increasing
consuIl'ptien and enhancing werkers' participatien in the labor proc:ess.
3. Prica .3CLl.im arñ planni.m criter:iat. Controls en prices and
the implementatien ef planning te replace price signals is
another feature associated with socialist models. Here we must
investigate what new price-setting mechanisms and other
institutienal characteristics are established fer furrlamental
resource allocatiens. Are various markets allowed a role, er
are they replaced by either decentralized planning mechanisms
er central planning? How is the relatienship between domestic
prices and inten1ational prices---esPeCially relevant in small,
open, peripheral contemporary economies---managed and
maintained?
Although China maintained a higher degree ef decentralizatien in its
planning structure, the experiences ef both China and the soviet Unien did
include centralized price-setting and the planned management ef output. As
FitzGerald notes, the task ef coordinating mixed fenns ef productien during
transitienal periods may require preservatien ef market-based transactiens,
particularly between different modes er fenns ef productien¡ 8 the minimizing ef
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market-based price signals in the soviet and Chinese experiences may partly
reflect the rapidly emerging dominance of the scx::ialist mode of production.
4. External policies cr:iterim. External economic. policies,
including relationships to international finance and the
international di vision of labor, may serve te distinguish not
only among varieties of scx::ialist experiences but also between
scx::ialist experiences and state capitalist experiences¡
nations in the latter category, for example, generally maintain
extensive connections with international capitalismo In
exarnining external policies, we should ask: Te what extent does
the scx::iety "delink" itself (in the words of Diaz Alejandro) 9
or otherwise turn inward , rather than outward, in its
development strategies? Te what extent will international
financial assistance be sought and international trade be
maintained? How will the nation choose to align itself among
international blocs?
Because the character of international insti tutions and the functioning of
the international econorny in the 1980s are very different from what they were
at the time of the soviet or the Chinese revolution, these previous experiences
may be less relevant for the Nicaraguan case. Indeed, the classic autarchic
strategy pursued by China, first after 1949, then more corrpletely after the
break from the soviet Union, may be Í1TpOSsible in Nicaragua due te both its
relatively small size and the historie limitations on domestic production
created by previous colonialismo Even in contemporary scx::ialist countries,
however, the questions of limiting, controlling, and taking advantage of the
international division of labor remain liTIportant policy concerns.
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5. Broader n:role of the staten criterim. '!he extent of the
government' s invol vement in internal development strategies--
including the degree of the state 's power in the econorny, the
levels of worker self-management, and the space left for the
capitalist sector (if it continues to function) ---is a
particularly knotty dilemma for socialist societies. In
evaluating whether a society is socialist, we might ask: How
extensive has the role of the state become? What specifie :roles
does it play? What teclmiques, what goals, what instruments are
employed? What institutions function outside the state and how
do they function?
'!he archetypal socialist models of the soviet union and a1ina are marked
by a significant enhancement of the state' s responsibilities for short-ron
macroeconomie management and long-ron development, as well as by a direct state
role in production itself. '!he preeminent role of the state in the Chinese and
Soviet experiences has been eritieized as bureaucratie authoritarianism by
Bahro10 and as little more than state capitalism by Cleaver. 11 Distinguishing
the socialist state and socialist development from the varieties of stqte
capitalism found in contemporary Mexico or Brazil has also been a tapie of
i1rpJrtance te contemporary socialists. Obviously, an extensive state role is
not enough te characterize a development path as socialist¡ we must also
examine, for exarnple, the new roles of working-class organizations as well as
the various other criteria we are developing here. Nonetheless, socialism has
usually been associated with expansion of state proPerty and state power.
6. Ccmrt:errevolutiCl1arV reactim criterim. '!he histo:ry of the
need for defense of the transition itself suggests an
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additional, ironic criterion: that the degree of socialism (or
at least the historical arxi institutional distance from the
prevailing global capitalist alternative) is evidenced by the
extent to which the new society needs . to be defen:iOO against
economic arxi military aggression. It follows, then, that new
policies are restricted by, arxi economic perfonnance is
affected by, the need to defen:i the revolution against
counterrevolution.
'l11e october Revolution 100 to civil war arxi external aggression, both of
which overshadowOO the initial development of the early soviet nroel. 'l11e total
defeat of the Kuomintang left China relatively free of serious external
military aggression in the formative years of its revolutionary regime, but
international economic isolation arxi aggression dictated some of its early
inward orientation. Virtually every 'lbird World nation that has tun1ed toward a
IrDre socialistic development strategy has experienced both military arxi
economic pressures to stem or liroit the transition. In evaluating a counb:y's
choices of policy arxi social direction, we rnust not only recognize the need for
self-defense but also reflect on the impact of such self-defense on the
POSsibilities for successful development. Nicaragua would seem to be no
exception to t.~is general pattem.
Class Orientatim
In establishing the above criteria for evaluating alternative socialist
modes of organization we have for the IrDSt part followed previous autbors. We
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have, hov.rever, excluded Jameson and wilber' s suggestion that the fonn in which
a govemment took power is important in detennining the socialist character of
a society. Both the soviet and the Chinese experiences did invol ve tumul tuous
revolutions and extraconstitutional processes. Nonetheless, revolutions, coups,
and barracks revolts are also connnon modes of taking power in capitalist
countries. At the same time, the electoral, nonviolent accession of Manley in
Jamaica and of Allende in Chile does not disqualify these transitions as
socialist; certainly the method of coming to power did little te lessen
counterrevolutionary attacks against thero.
'lhat power seizure and electoral successes both produced governments we
might label as socialist suggests that there is one criterion not dealt with
directly by Jameson and Wilber or FitzGerald: the class criterion. From their
origins in classical Marxist analysis, both the soviet and the Chinese
experiences represent revolutionary change designed te benefit the working
class, the PeaSantry, and allied classes. '!he choices necessitated by a rnnnber
of the criteria above---the decision, for exaIrple, to expropriate capitalist
property or te involve the state in the provision of basic connnodities---follov.r
fram a focus upon the needs of oppressed peoples within a distinctly
class-based and class-divided society. '!he difference between the
extraconstitutional processes of the militarily based "revolutions" in Brazil,
Peru, and South Korea and those that characterized China and CUba, for exaIrple,
is that the latter revolutions sought te put previously diSPOSsessed social
groups in power. Similarly, the distinction between the state's role in
socialism and its role in state capitalism in the 'lhird World is largely linked
te the groups for whorn the state is acting. As shown belov.r, the Nicaraguan
experiment, despite other differences fram socialist archetyPes, is intended te
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benefit workers arrl peasants. A unique feature of the first years of Sa:rrlinista
:rule, however, was the way the Nicaraguan revolution atteIrpted to maintain a
broad multiclass alliance while pursuing the commitment to. certain specific
classes. We return to this point below.
J:»mr.a.atic Pl:ooess: 'Ihe Jamaican RDad
A further criterion for evaluating socialism emerges from the experience
of Jamaica uro.er Prime Minister Michael Manley arrl his People' s National Party
(FNP). In his personal retrospective on eight years in power as a "deIOOcratic
socialist," Manley tells how the search for a political program led the FNP to
forge a new developmental strategy between two contemporary possibilities which
he saw as diametrically opposed: market capitalism arrl state-daminated
socialism.12 SUch a "third path" was also attempted in Chile uro.er Allerrle, in
Portugal frcm 1974 to 1976, in Guyana after 1966, arrl in Tanzania arrl Angola¡
we focus on the Jamaican experience as an alternative that may have suggested
various policies to the sarrlinista Front in Nicaragua partly because it
occurred cluring the fonnative years of the sarrlinista IlYJVement arrl partly
because Jamaica, like Nicaragua, had to leant to deal with the reaction of the
United states to its experimento
In developing the argument for a "third path," Manley suggested first that
Jamaica in the early 1970s had inherited the fundamental characteristics of
classical colonies. In his view, no atteIrpt had ever been made to produce what
was needed for Jamaica, onl Y what was needed by someone else outside Jamaica.
Moreover, trade invol ved not the careful exchange of relati ve surpluses, but
rather the inportation of all that was needed arrl the export of all that was
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produced. Finally, the surplus that might have been used to increase local
production was consistently exported as profits.13
One solution to Jamaica' s problems was to adopt the model of Puerto Rico,
a model that stressed the development of a nanufacturing sector arrl relied upon
foreign capital arrl tecimology. Manley felt, however, that Jamaica had already
been applying the Puerto Rico model since the Norman Manley goverrnnent of the
1950s. Bauxite arrl alurninum investments, production, arrl exports grew
dramatically, but so did iroports of the raw material arrl intermediate inputs
needed for production. '!hus, by 1968
behind the glittering indicators of success lay stark facts.
Unemployment was increasing. Social services reflected little
:i111provement. '!he degree of economic depp...ooence was actually
increasing rather than decreasing. Finally, the traditional problem
of exporting surplus to foreign owners rernained unchanged because
new industries were also foreign.14
An alternative model open to Jamaica was that of CUba, a country that had
atternpted to eliminate the :i111poverishing neocolonial system by nationalizing
all foreign capital, diversifying production to fulfill domestic needs, arrl
stimulating industrialization on the basis of the newly nationalized profits of
sugar exports. In Cuba, the fundamental social problems of concern to Manley---
ernployment, health care, arrl education---had been addressed directly arrl
successfully by the state. While noting these accornplishrnents, Manley felt
uncomfortable with Cuba 's political system arrl lamented the lack of political
rights for those "outside of the revolution. ,,15 He argued instead for: "another
path, a third path, a Jamaican way rooted in our political experience arrl
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values, capable of providing an economic base to our political irrleperñence aro
capable of S0100measure of social justice for the people.
,,16
Manley's critique of the CUban experience suggests an additional criterion
for evaluating a society in transition: the -democratic process criterio n
Manley' s notions of democratic process were, in large part, a reflection of the
parliamenta:ry system Jamaica had adopted from the advanced capitalist
countries, particularly England, and he failed to recognize grass roots
participation in CUban decision-making processes or to distinguish between
political processes that reflected the initial direction of the revolution and
the social controls forced on CUba by external aggression. Nonetheless, Manley
was critical of the CUban experience in that his notion of democratic process
required not only that the citizenry actively participate in crucial decisions
about the transition but also that S0100 political space be allowed for a viable
opposition. Whether his criterion reflects a luxury available primarily to
governments that come to power by electoral means and within relati vely well-
established traditional electoral systems is less iIrportant than the fact that
there exist many others for which this democratic process criterion is also
iIrportant.
When Manley' s PNP was swept into office in 1972, the new goverrnnent' s
policies were substantially less dramatic than might have been expected fran
what was billed as a deliberate attempt to create some fonn of "democratic
socialism." Rather than expropriate the foreign-dominated bauxite COITpanies,
Manley created a financial surplus for the state by sharply increasing the
severance taxes on their production. While the state itself grew only to the
extent that it absorbed bankrupt finns and expanded f'L1rrlamental services,17
Manley' s government extended its economic role by introducing price controls on
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wage goods, increasiD;J subsidies in order to make many basic goods lOOre widely
available, arrl ilrplementiD;J iIrport controls to save available foreign exc.harxJe
for use on essential ccmnodities. Health arrl education programs were also
enlargOO, often with the aid of CUban teachers arrl medical personnel.
As time went on, however, opposition to the new policiés by foreign
investors arrl leniers, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), arrl the
foreign-daminated raw materials irrlustries caused a series of financial crises
in the external sector. 'Ihese exchange prablems, arrl the intervention of the
IMF, 100 to the rePeal of many of the bauxite export taxes arrl some of the
iIrport arrl price controls. Less able to provide for the basic needs of bis
constituency, Manley lost his political support. In 1980, the collective
influence of the opPOSition press, deterioratiD;J damestic arrl international
econamic conditions, arrl overt support by the U.S. government for bis electoral
opponent, Fdward Seaga, brought the entire experiment to an eni.
'!he Jamaican experience, arrl the equally significant experience of Allenie
in Chile, suggested that meetiD;J the deIOOCratic process criterion (at least as
specifiOO by Manley) might undernri.ne the ability to briD;J about real structural
transfonnation of the economy, partly because the criterio n allowed
counter-revolutionary or antisocialist elements wide latitude to sabotage
econamic arrl social change. For the Sarrlinistas, this possibility must have
increased interest in the lOOre dramatic arrl less pluralistic paths followOO by
the Soviet Union, China, arrl, in this hemisphere, CUba.
We now use the criteria develoPed from the Chinese arrl Soviet experiences
as well as from the Jamaican "third path" to contrast the emergiD;J Nicaraguan
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society arrl economy with that of CUba, the country with which Nicaragua is l1IOSt
often con-pared in the popular press. Insofar as possible, we attempt te
contrastthe first seven years of post-insurrection Nicaragua (1979-1986) with a
similar time span in CUba. As we shall see, the differences between the two
countries are sometimes striking.
Initial IOli.cies
After 1:he revolutionary triunph in 1959, CUba quickly nationalized
virtually all foreign capital and all foreign larXlholdings; export agriculture,
especia¡ly sugar production, wasthe main target in a deliberate attempt te
financesocial prograrns fram the surplus generated in that foreign-oriented
sector. By the mid-1960s two waves of agrarian reform had washed across CUba,
and two-thirds of agricul ture had been transfo:rmed into state-run fanns or
s,tate-controlled cooperatives. '!he vast majority of production arrl nearly all
employment were state-controlled, with l1IOSt basic camooclities distributed
through a complex rationing system. As CUba sought to institute East European-
stylecentralized planning, rnarkets played a very srnall role in determining
prices, production levels, labor allocation, and a host of other :furx3amental
,
' abl 18econonu.c varl es.
In Nicaragua, in contrast, seven years after the insurrection major
IIUlltinational firms con,tinue to ftmction, both irrleperrlently and in mixed
enterprises with the government. Most praminent am:>ngthem are Exxon, Royal
Dltch Shell, arrl Texaco (petroleum refining and production of derivatives for
sale throughout Central America); British-American Tobacco (cigarette
manufacture for local consumption and export to Europe); and Pan American
(hotels and motels). '!he list also includes nearly a hundred other major
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multinationals that provide substantial quantities of new computer equipment
(IEM¡'Mexico), private and public accounting services (Frica, Waterl1ouse), and
training in public administration (Harvard University).
In addition, export agricu1ture in Nicaragua has remained predc:minant1y in
private hands (to the dismay of some early soviet commentators as well as some
observers on the Nicaraguan left) .19 Instead of na~ionalization and
collectivization of all export production, Nicaragua chose to nationalize the
trading of exports, negotiating prices of inputs ani haJ:vests with capitalist
producers in a contentious process that was often mistaken outside Nicaragua
for sinple private sector complaints about the revolutionary government. 'Ibis
approach reflected a conscious atteJnpt to stimulate aCClm1l1).ation by using
surpluses realized in international trade. '!he strategy was accompanied,
however, by a variety of political problems, particu1arly when the need to
placate the capitalist agricu1tural sector with special treatment and maintain
downward pressures on agricu1 tural wages clashed with the interests of the
worker and peasant base of the Sandinista Front (FSLN).
Agrarian refonn in revolutionary Nicaragua was also dramatica1ly different
frorn that in CUba. By the rnid-1980s, nearly a third of the total land affected
had been distributed to cooperatives and individuals with private, irrev~le
titles, and by 1985 the vast majority of expropriated land was being
distributed to small producers and cooperatives rather than being converted
into state fanns. Moreover, the participation of the Nicaraguan peasantJ::y in
the design and inplementation of agrarian refonn was unusually active by
comparison with the role of peasants in other socialist (and nonsocial.ist)
experiences, a feature consistent with the democracy criterion suggested by
Manley.20 A final difference with archetypically socialist land refonns was
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the role reservedfor large private estates, a role e}(plicitly guaranteed by
provisions in the 1981 Agrarian Refonn I.aw stating that effectively used land
could not be e}(propriated, no matter how large the holdings.- Although peasant
unrest in 1985 did lead the Sandinista government to e}(propriate land near
Masaya (including some that belonged te an iIrp:>rtant leader of the interna1
civilian opposition) and te authorize, in January 1986, the further
e}(propriation of land "for public use or social interest," the large capitalist
landholders retained an iIrp:>rtance in the accumulation process unusual for a
"socialist" agrarian refonn.
'!be labor Prooess arrl Basic Needs
By the mid-1960s the CUban labor market had been radically transfonned.
Most job assigrnnents were made through goverrnnent agencies as part a process
supposedly designed to rationalize the use of a work force whose enployment was
guaranteed. '!he onus of responsibility for finding enployment had thus been
shifted from the individual worker to the state, and open unenployment had been
substantially reduced.
In the Nicaragua of the mid-1980s open unenployment was in excess of 20
percent in urban areas. '!he state had made no attenpt te take direct
responsibility for providing enployment te a majority of the population. Labor
markets had not been restricted and it remained the individual worker's
responsibility te find a job capable of providing for his or her sustenance.
Nicaragua had, however, developed a series of programs that reflected a
commitment te fulfill people's basic needs. '!he well-docrnnented literacy
crusade, a series of health mobilizations, establishment of the universal right
te free health care, and rapid ~ion of educational opportunities and
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enrollments all bear witness to this commitment, especially since these
policies were established in corrlitions of considerable econamic duress.21
'Ibis, of course, mirrors CUba IS own rapid expansion of heal th care anj
education in the earliest years of the revolutionary regime.
While Nicaragua avoided excessive intervention in labor markets, it did
intervene in product markets by establishing sane price controls am rati~
systems.Initiated in early 1980, the rationing was designed (1) to protect the
standard of living of the iIrp:werished majority as the country umeJ:Went the
severe macroeconamic adjustment required by the devastation that followed the
insurrection arrl by the world economic crisis of 1980-1983, am (2) to serve as
a reclistributive measure to raise the effective standard of living of the poor
majority. Althoughrationed products were generally also available at
unsubsidized prices in the marketplace arrl in food stores, by the mid-1980s
Nicaragua was suffering severe shortages of many goods abuOOantly available to
middle- arrl high-i.ncoroo groups in the rest of Central AIoorica am in roc>st other
srnall countries: gasoline, cooki.n9' oil, many types of naticine, paper, arrl a
wide variety of other Western inp:>rted goods, especially luxw:y goods. '!he
shortage of inp:>rted goods in particular arose from a deliberate govemment
decision to use limited hard currency to import items IrOre necessary for
continued production or for meeting basic needs i whereas this policy may have
suggested insensitivity to those whose consumption pattems included IrOre
inp:>rted goods, it does not i1t1ply chaos or the si1t1ple malfunctioning of the
econamy. en the contrary, the whole rationing apparatus reflected the political
decision to have the state "manage scarcity" rather than "letting scarcity
manage itself" through an unfettered price mechanism that would benefit higher
20
country's mJSt important exp:>rt product, coffee, in order te stem capital
flight.
Government control of the banking system and intemational. trade, as well
as the expansion of govennnent distribution systeIns, did narrow the realm
within which Nicaraguan private producers could function. '!hose who were
previously engaged in import-export businesses were particularly affected. en
the one ham, because the govennnent absoIDed I1'K)re of the risk of price
fluctuations for both imports and exp:>rts, producers were better protected from
the vicissitudes of international markets. en the other, they faced I1'K)re
government regulations, such as mínimum wage requirements and higher
occupational safety and heal th standards. '!he context within which
profit-making decisions are made in Nicaragua had been deliberately altered,
arrl many businesspeople who were sucx:=essful before 1979 decided that they
could not operate under the new corxiitions. Nonetheless, in contrast with the
ext.ensively socialized econorny of CUba, the Nicaraguan econorny remained
predominantly private.
Ext:en1al tJOlicies
CUba did not have the option of autarchy enjoyed by such socialist giants
as China and the soviet Union. Its natural resource limitations, the colonial
heritage of exp:>rt I1'K)noculture, and low levels of industrialization meant that
CUba had te retain sorne niche in the international di vision of labor. Whatever
its original intentions, however, the CUban government was forced te turn te
the socialist bloc for trading Partners after the punitive embargo litposed in
1961 by the United states and subsequently agreed to by a majority of latin
American governments. CUba also depen:ied on socialist countries for developnent
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finance, partly because its abrogation of external debt te capitalist countries
arxi institutions nade borrowing in international credit markets iIrpossible.22
At the outset, Nicaragua had a better opportunity than CUba te reduce
deperrlence on international trade, partly because Nicaraguan agricultura!
production possibilities are richer arxi IOOrevaried than those of CUba arxi thus
agricultura! self-sufficiency was IOOreeasily within Nicaragua's reach. Rather
than attenpting a quick arxi perllaps costly shift te self-sufficiency, however,
Nicaragua sought te di versify deperrlence---that is, te reduce reliance on a
singletrading partner, the United states--while continuing te benefit fran its
c::arparati ve advantage in certain exports. Te reach this goal, Nicaragua tried
te exparrl arxi diversify its participation in the international capitalist
system of trade arxi finance while simultaneously using state control arñ
appropriation of most of the surplus or "profits" generated te iIrprove the
consequences of international integration. Although Nicaragua also developed
extensive trade arxi credit relations with the socialist bloc countries, only
approximately 25 percent of all financial assistance (other than militaJ:y)
between 1979 arxi the beginning of 1985 had come from these countries; a
considerably smaller proportion of Nicaragua' s total trade was with the same
countries.23 In May 1985, however, the United states iITpOSed an embargo on
trade with Nicaragua; this action will likely make it more difficult for the
Sarxiinistas to avoid the excessi ve financial arxi trade reliance on the
socialist bloc which is typical of CUba.
In contrast with CUba' s approach te the debts incurred by the
prerevolutionary regime, the Nicaraguan govennnent committed itself te
sel:Vicing its international debt, expecting that this policy would leave open
the channels of intemational financial assistance which have been available
22
both te other transitional societies (such as Tanzania) and te established
socialist societies (such as Poland).
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'!he World Bank, applauding Nicaragua
for its "responsible" decision, initially proposed that substantial amounts of
aid be providoo.25 After 1981, however, intervention from the United states
representatives at the World Bank, the Export- Import Bank, the International
Monetary F\md, and the Inter-American Development Bank blocked most
multilateral loans and grants. 'lhis overt politicization of the lending process
has been criticizOO even by u.s. allies.26
']beRDle of the state
'!he comparison of CUba and Nicaragua also reveals basic differences in the
and functioning of the state and state planning in the econorny. As noted
earlier , in the rnid-1980s ma.rket signals continuOO to play an important role in
contemporcn:y Nicaragua. Farmers' decisions with resPeCt, to crops, fertilizers,
herbicide and insecticide combinations, and the employment of labor were, for
exanple, largely ma.rket-determinOO. '!he government's attempts to alter the
cx::mposition of production were mostly lirnited to moral suasion, the
establishment of rninirnum condi tions for the labor force, a variety of price and
credit incentives, and the setting of intermediate import prices. Indeed, one
ma.rket sector uncontrollOO by the state, the so-callOO informal sector,
actually expandOO in the first years of Sandinista rule as governrnent attempts
to hold dawn money wages in order to protect price and profit levelsin the
private capitalist sector 100 rnany wage workers to shiftto the self-ernployment
typical of informal acti vities in the hope of increasing their real incomes. 27
As for planning, in the rnid-1980s it remainOO a prirnitive art in
Nicaragua, hinderOO by the absence of even the most fundamental baseline data,
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by the lack ef instruments fer controllirx;;J the predaninantly private econany,
arxi by a shertage ef skilled planners. '!he plannin:;J that was urxlert:aken cama
much closer te the project-specific plannin:;J prcm:>ted by the .world Bank than te
the systematic awroaches ef Eastem Europa er China (er te the plannin:;J system
that finally began te functien in CUba in the 1970s). Plannin:;J. doctVIPnts,
discussions with planners, arxi government statements, shc:1.Nedlittle eviderx::e
that plannirx;;J carparable te the Soviet er contenporaxy 0.1ban no:iels was
contenplated. '!he ec:onanic role ef the state in Nicaragua was IOOStiy limitad te
ilrplementirx;;J fiscal arxi IOOneta3:ypolicy, managirx;;Jstate fan1\S, arxi ccn:luctirx;;J a
host ef SPeCialized programs te deal with concrete problems.
CaInt.PTl'"P-Unlut:.i.marv Reactioo ani the Defense ef the Revolutioo
Seven years after their resPeCtive :revelutiens, CUba arxi Nicaragua both
were subjected te direct milita3:y attacks by counterrevolutionary exiles
erganized arxi financed by the CIA. '!he two nations had also developed
relatively large, efficient, well-equipPed armies with the support ef the
Soviet Unien. Arrl both had seen the burden ef milita3:y experrli.tures adversely
affect their dornestic ec:onomies.
In the mid 1980s it became clear that the contra war had had a significant
ilrpact en Nicaragua' s ec:onomic progress arxi evolutien. By 1985 direct damage te
ec:onanic targets, especially in the coffee grcMirx;;J northem highlarxis, had c:ost
Nicaragua IOOre than $300 millien (a figure that has certainIy grown then) arxi
50 percent ef current goverrnnent experñiture were destined fer defense.28 Many
ef the lOOSt successful social programs, ilrplemented in 1979 arxi 1980, had been
slowed er hal ted by the ec:onomic demarrls ef the war. Fewer new schools arxi
clinics were constructed while agricultura! arxi irrlustrial production suffered
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because available hard currency was being used te support the war effort.
Moreover, the requirements of military mobilization had created chronic
shortages of manual labor.
'!he contra war, however, appeared te have had sorne positive effects in
terms of internal support for government economic policies. It is true that in
the absence of U.S. intervention, many private capitalists would have been
obligated to adjust te the new realities of a Sandinista Nicaragua; U.S.
support of counterrevolution encouraged these individual s to resist change and
engage in economic sabotage rather than find new avenues for profit-rnaking in
the transfo:rmed economic landscape. At the sarne time, the external origins and
financing of the contras were so clearly seen by to most Nicaraguans that even
those dissatisfied with some aSPects of the revolutionary process tended te
rally behind the government. There is anecdotal evidence that many pri vate-
sector producers and other Nicaraguans would have dernanded more of the
government if there had been no war. There was probably more acceptance of
rationing and shortages, and more support for austerity, than might have
existed if no external aggression had been directed against Nicaragua. At the
sarne time, it is clear that a less painful way te reta in political support
would have been to accorrplish those developmental tasks being derailed by the
war.
'!he Role of Class
It is in the fundamental class orientation of the revolution that
Nicaragua draws closest to both CUba in particular and the socialist archetypes
in general. One feature that distinguishes the growth of the state in Nicaragua
from similarly extensive state expansion in Brazil is the support the Brazilian
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state gave to elites in what might be termed a "capitalist acx::umulation
project." In contrast, Nicaraguan state policy has been designed to meet tlle
basic needs of the principal constituents of the Sandinista Front: the wor)dn;J
class and the peasantIy.
Although the Sandinista Front did inten:i the new develcpnent path to
benefit prilnarily workers and peasants, it arguoo that its accumulation project
represented a broadly conceivOO "logic of the majority." 'lhis broad vision, a
unique feature of the Nicaraguan model, allowOO the front to draw support fran
a wide variety of classes. '!he multiclass character of tlle developnental
strategy, as well as the continuing roles for markets and private property
described above, even 100 sane to the left of the Sandinistas to fear that
Nicaragua would evolve into a state-supported capitalist econany with a strorq,
hegenonic party born of the revolutionary process--that is, another Mexico.
R>litica1 ParticiDatim
We turn now to the criterion of special concern to Michael Manley:
denncratic processes. Evaluating derocx::racy and the adequacy of political
participation is always a thorny and hotly disputed process. Without doubt,
CUba represents a transition model that has not btplemented traditional Western
electoral processes. '!here is evidence that grass roots participation in
fundamental decision rnaking in CUba exists to an extent generally ignored by
many of that nation's critics. Yet, the lack of an opposition press and of
other vehicles for voicing dissent, the centralization of most social and
economic decision making, and the absence of COIItJE!ting political parties leaves
CUba open to the sort of criticisrns Manley and others might voice.
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In Nicaragua, on the other hand, continuous arrl contentious expressions of
opposition marked most of the early years of the revolution. A100ng the mass
organizations that were critical of the goverrnnent, some to its -right arrl some
to its left, were anti-Sarrlinista private-sector, labor union, arrl church-based
groups. '!he newspaPer with the largest paid circulation, la Prensa, was
virolently anti-Sarrlinista¡ before June 1986, it had never been blocked from
publishing for more than a few days at a tbne, albeit often with partial
oensorship. '!he level of oensorship varied in resPQnse te severa! factors: the
onset arrl deepening of the counterrevolutionary war, worsening social arrl
economic con:litions, arrl a terrlency of the paPer' s owners arrl editers te test
the lllnits of oensorship with deliberately provocative articles.29
Along with the attenpt to maintain a degree of political space for
opposition forees, Nicaragua moved te ensure popular participation in
goverrnnent decision making. By the mid-1980s this effort had passed through a
number of phases. In the irmnediate aftermath of the insurrection, a wide
variety of nationally oriented mass organizations had been fonred. In
addition, all major constituencies were initially represented in the COUncil of
state, a body that was, in fact, largely dominated by worker arrl peasant groups
throughout its short history. 30
By 1984 elections had been held for a new legislati ve body arrl for the
presidency. Although the elections have been publicly criticized (with little
detail) by the U.S. Deparbnent of state, numerous international observer groups
have concluded that the electoral process was fair arrl legitimate.31 When the
new National Assembly began to operate in 1985, thirty-four of ninety-six seats
were held by representatives of six opPOSition political parties, arrl the
Sarrlinista political base of workers arrl peasants actually had less explicit
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arrl proportional representation than it had enjoyed under the transitional
council.
In October 1985 the Sarrlinista govemrnent ~ a state of emergency on
the nation, thus restricting civil liberties. Although some analysts argue that
the scope of restrictions was exaggerated in the media, arrl that the decision
was based on legiti1nate fears about the fonnation of a new internal front in
the ongoing counterrevolutionary war, the state of emergency deal t a blow te
Nicaragua' s internation~Ü i1nage.32 '!he i1nage was further darnaged when, in June
1986, on the heels of a U.S. congressional vote te increase aid te the contras,
the Sarrlinista gove:rnment abandoned its flexibility in applying the state-of-
emergency rules arrl closed down la Prensa. Despite these prablems, it remains
difficult te dismiss Nicaragua' s commi.tment te pluralism as mere wirrlow
dressing, particularly in view of the external arrl internal constraints on
Nicaraguan demx::ractic structures posed by intervention arrl counterrevolution.
By the mid-1980s Nicaragua had irrleed moved in the direction of some fonn
of socialismo At the same time, the evolving economic arrl social experiment
models in Nicaragua exhibited nany important differences from the archetypal
models of the Soviet Union arrl the People' s Republic of China, the "third path"
of Jamaica, or the experience of revolutionary CUba. '!he najor role played by
the private sector in critical agricultural exports, the use of narket
processes for wholesale arrl retail distribution of goods, the active role of
labor unions arrl peasantry in the design arrl iIrplementation of the IOOSt
important policies affecting their own welfare, arrl the relatively high levels
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of ¡x>litical pluralism and public dialogue all combined to make the Nicaraguan
experience a distinct transitional experimento
It is not clear, however, whether the Nicaraguan ¡x>licies embody toa many
contradictions te permit the consolidation of a stable and viable IOOdel of
development. will the present mode of accumulation, based on the state as locus
of accumulation and dri ven by continued exports of unprocessed agricul tural
products, generate the surplus needed to undawrite programs for the
fulfill111ent of basic needs? will the atterrpt to preserve the private sector in
crucial roles prove compatible with national needs for expanded production and
i.nprovements in the living standards of the POQrest groups? will the capitalist
class ultbnately be able to accept the state's leading role in investment? Can
the Sandinista Front retain sufficient ¡x>litical strength te pennit resolution
of the ongoing class conflict in its favor? will Nicaraguan society IOOVetoward
the more centralized socialism fourrl in CUba or perhaps toward a more
capitalist model, such as that in Puerto Rico? Can the turn toward the latter
be achieved under the the continued hegemony of the Sandinista Front?
While these internal conflicts and contradictions are certainly
problematic enough, the stability and viability of the Nicaraguan model is also
Partly dependent on the reaction of international actors such as the united
states. Unfortunately for Nicaragua, the U.S. has thus far reacted with great
alarmo As a result, the Sandinista goven11TleI1thas been confronted by a U.S.
economic embargo, constant U.S. military maneuvers in neighboring Honduras, and
a counterrevolutionary military force trained and funded by the United states.
If the United States-funded counterrevolutionary war continues through the
decade, shortages and production difficul ties rnay lead Nicaragua te IOOVe
¡x>licies away from the present experiment with a mixed economy and closer te
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the IOOre orthodox socialist experiences of CUba, arina, an:i the Soviet union.
If forced upon Nicaragua, this direction could still result in significant
inprovements over the economic system inherited fran the Samoza dynasty; it
'-" d not h seem to be what the architects of the. Nicara guan IOOdel, C1i/e'Iler,
originally had in Ini.OO.
In the early an:i mid-1980s the cha11enge for U.S. policy was to recxx;Jl'lize
that Nicaragua was developing an alternative to both the Soviet an:i CUban
nmels as well as to the prototypical free-enterprise system. '!he Reagan
Mministration met this challenge by labeling the Sarxlinistas Marxist-Ieninist
an:i launchin;J a political, military, and econamic aggression against Nicaragua
which is easily interpreted as a deliberate attenpt to sabotage the saminista
experimento Yet even if U.S. objectives in the 'lhird World include the
preservation of pri vate sector participation and maintenance of international
systems of trade and finance, Nicaragua offers a potentially exciting
developnent IOOdel in which rapid accumulation is consistent with furrlamentally
deroocratic processes. For the rest of the decade, the continuing question is
whether the United states, perhaps under a new administration, will leave
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